Introduction
Why did the Soviet Union not embrace the Douhetian theory of strategic bombing while other world powers did? Throughout the 1920's and 30's leading nations around the world not only strove to create a viable air force for utilization in future wars, but did so with an emphasis on strategic bombing. This Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was viewed by its advocates as something that could potentially preclude massive, protracted land campaigns and the atrocious casualties inherent therein. Breaking the bloody paradigm of Verdun, Flanders and other costly campaigns of The Great War was on the minds of such theorists as Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell as they developed theories of strategic bombing that that would ultimately be tested in World war II.
America, Great Britain, France, Italy and even Germany endeavored (to varying degrees) to create air forces capable of striking at the heartland of an opponent. In the United States this effort was manifested in the Air Corps Tactical school developing the "industrial web" theory as a practical application of strategic bombing -aimed at destroying the domestic will, infrastructure, and manufacturing capacity of an adversary.
Mainly in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) from 1942 -1945, and under the overall direction of such men as Arnold and Portal, the U.S. Strategic Air Forces and the RAF Bomber Command put into practice, and modified, the strategic bombing theories that had been promulgated for two decades. Under the command of such luminaries as Spaatz, Harris, Eaker, and Doolittle the credence (or lack thereof) of strategic bombing was validated. The Soviet military was a keen observer of these efforts while adhering to a different focus for their own air force. Indeed during the interwar period the Soviet Union too had been building an air force and a doctrine for its employment. They had built so called long range bombers and even used them for strikes against Berlin in 1941. But these were more token efforts at demonstrating that they could do so, than a commitment to that particular theory of warfare. Traditional Russian insecurity with regards to the Western Powers, perceived "permanent operating conditions", technological short comings, and certain leadership deficiencies combined to
give Soviet strategic bombing endeavors secondary, even negligible, importance. Only after the advent of the nuclear age (specifically by the early 1950's) would strategic bombing become paramount to Soviet defense doctrine.
This study is focused on showing why circumstances unique to the Soviet Union caused her to disregard a strategic bombing role for her air force, until (ironically) a second RMA (the development of nuclear weapons) required it. In doing so, the study will be broken down into six parts. First, to provide context, a brief historical review of the strategic bombing theory that became significant to air forces around the world during the interwar period. Second, (and directly related to main point number one) a more detailed account of what the Soviet military in general, and the Soviet Air Force in particular was doing during this same period to develop a doctrine and organization for national defense. Third, Soviet reaction to how the Allies applied strategic bombing in the ETO from 1942 ETO from -1945 , and what the Soviet Air Force was doing on the Eastern Front at this same time (this part reinforces main point one in that Soviet experience and observations during WWII reaffirmed their own decision to forsake strategic bombing).
Fourth, the changes in the Soviet Union during the early 1950's that brought about a shift toward developing a strategic bombing air force (main point number two). Fifth, how by the 1970's the Soviet Air Force had largely returned to its traditional ground support role (main point number three). The sixth, and final, part will provide conclusions and analysis as to what other options or alternatives (if any) were not only feasible, but (moreover) more promising than that which was adopted in terms of Soviet air force doctrine and strategy.
The Advent of Strategic Bombing
The attrition heavy, stalemated campaigns of The Great War caused military theorists around the world to search for ways to return maneuver to warfare and thus reduce casualties in future conflicts. While ground warriors, such as the Briton J.F.C.
Fuller, saw the maneuver potential of massed armored columns of tanks as a way to achieve this end, emerging air power theorists foresaw an even more unprecedented form of warfare as being decisive in the future -strategic bombing.
One of the leading proponents of this new theory was the Italian general Giulio Douhet. Having been a member of the Italian General Staff since 1900, heavily involved in Italy's use of dirigibles in military service prior to World War I, he also commanded the lone Italian aviation battalion in 1912. As was the case with other air power pioneers his outspokenness ultimately found him falling into disfavor with the establishment -first by ordering the unauthorized construction of several Caproni Bombers in 1914 (in reaction to a dreadfully reluctant bureaucracy), then during WWI for his outspoken criticism of how the Italian government was waging war. This resulted in his court martial and dismissal from the service. In 1921 he wrote and had published The Command of the Air, that espoused an independent role for modern air forces. Douhet's work contended that air power was revolutionary because it operated in the "third dimension" unhampered by land constraints. His thoughts on the optimum advantages of strategic bombing were that if afforded the ability to strike at an opponent's "vital centers" (as opposed to the traditional view of hitting the field forces exclusively) from which the means to wage war came. Accordingly, he saw five primary target systems as critical: industry, transportation infrastructure, communication nodes, government buildings, and the will of the people. This last target was paramount to him as modern war entailed the involvement of not only a nation's armies, but their citizenry as well.
Another European air power advocate, and strategic bombing theorist was Great Britain's first Chief of the Royal Air Force (RAF), 1919 -1930 Hugh Trenchard. Like Douhet, Trenchard had seen the atrocious cost in human life that the Great War had reaped. Also like Douhet, Trenchard felt that that harvest of unconscionable loss had been sown with the seeds of dogma. In short, those responsible for the execution of the war had adhered to outdated methods in the face of emerging technological advances. In the interwar period, Trenchard strove to redress this situation, but unlike Douhet he was operating from a position within the establishment. This would make his contributions to air power and strategic bombing both more conservative, and yet (from a practical standpoint) more effectual. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that while he personally believed that bombing strikes against enemy factories, their workers, and by extension the enemy populace would be decisive in future wars, he never lost sight of the fact that the necessarily expeditionary nature of British land force involvement made it impossible to envision a British Air Force that could be totally divorced from some form of ground support role. Consequently, he saw an air campaign that would focus on what we would today call "interdiction type targets: rail yards, bridges, supply depots, and road networks." Also, his official position in the RAF hierarchy made him acutely aware of the plain fact that British bombers had neither the range nor the payload (at that point in time) to be decisive alone. Yet, fundamentally he held three strong philosophical beliefs regarding air power which would influence British follow-on disciples (such as Slessor and "Bomber" Harris): "air superiority was an absolute prerequisite to military success, air power was inherently a strategic and offensive weapon, and that airpower's psychological effects were even greater than its significant material effects". Those last two premises translated directly to strategic bombing. They were particularly influential in that Trenchard's views were formalized and codified in RAF doctrinal manuals and regulations of the interwar period.
America's venture into the development and promulgation of strategic bombing theory can best be summarized by reviewing the efforts of Billy Mitchell and the institutional outgrowths of his endeavors. Without citing his entire career path, suffice it to say that Brigadier William "Billy" Mitchell emerged from WWI as an influential and articulate, if often vitriolic, advocate of air power in general and an independent American air force in particular. As one of the leading airmen in Pershing's American Expeditionary Force (AEF) he had held positions of increasing responsibility as Chief of Air Service at the brigade, corps, army and army group level. Early on, as senior airmen in theater at the time, he had been Chief of the Air Service, AEF. Perhaps more importantly, these positions gave him occasion to meet and relate professionally with both Trenchard, and to a lesser degree, Douhet. Following the war Mitchell's continued outspoken advocacy of the bomber resulted in his well documented court martial and dismissal from the Army. Under the umbrella heading of "industrial web" bombing ACTS developed a theory of warfare that would utilize an independent air force whose role would be inherently strategic. As such it would focus it's main effort using long range bombers to carry the war to the heartland of an enemy an destroy his industrial capacity to wage war as well as his will to do so. Five principles were formulated accordingly: disruption or paralysis of an enemy nations reliance on major industrial and economic systems undermines both that enemy's capacity and (emphasis added) will to fight, bombs can be delivered with sufficient accuracy to destroy the critical points of those major systems, massed bomber strikes can penetrate enemy air defense, proper selection of those vital targets is necessary to achieve decisive victory through the air, attacking enemy population within cities (preferably not indiscriminately) may be necessary if enemy resistance persists even after successful paralysis of selected targets has been achieved. Consequently, it spent the decades of the 1920's and 30's attempting to build such an entity. In seeing how this impacted formation of air force organization and doctrine in that country it is instructive to review certain aspects of that internal endeavor: attempts at creating a combined arms force, affect of early air power advocates on the embryonic Soviet Air Force, preoccupations with size (in terms of both individual aircraft and quantity), ground support versus long range bombing, the conflict between traditional ground warfare proponents and Soviet air power enthusiasts, and the effect of Stalin's purges of the officer corps on doctrinal and organizational progress. published after his execution). He consistently put forth the belief that to maximize the return on aviation employment they must: concentrate necessary air forces in sufficient numbers for a given operation, commit them to action when and where the enemy least expects it, and do so with the different types of aviation (reconnaissance, pursuit, bomber) working in close cooperation. These can be viewed as traditional principles of war being applied to the air dimension. While his later works focused more and more on the role of the bomber and an independent air force the results of battle in the air, Lapchinskiy understood the need to provide ground support. This is seen in his definition of air supremacy: " air supremacy does not mean being able to fly a lot.
Notes
Instead it means being able to with a greater sense than the enemy. This 'sense' is defined by the degree to which the air forces permit friendly troops to capitalize on the battle in the air …"
This conotates the modern notion of air supremacy being a prerequisite to successful ground operations. Other strategic air force proponents included V.K. Triandafillov, General B.M. Feldman and R.P. Eidman. They represented a group of early Soviet air power enthusiasts who saw a more independent role for the Soviet Air Force as potentially decisive, and the long range bomber as key to that role.
Attempts by bomber advocates within the Soviet establishment to create a bomberdominant force had peaked in late 1935. At that time 60% of their force were bombers.
Those such as Air Chief of Staff V.V. Khripin contended that "it is impossible to wage modern warfare without conducting independent air operations." The mainstream Red
Army leadership saw the creation of the heavy bomber force in 1936, designated TBA (Tyazhelaya bombardirovochnaya aviatsiya), as diverting the air force from its primary role of ground support. Manifesting this school of thought was the production, in the mid-30's, of "long range", heavy bombers of the four-engine TB-3 type (designed by Tupolev). By 1939, in the wake of the purges of 1938, its production had ceased. The twin-engine SB-3 and SB-2 and DB-3 were also produced in large numbers. However, they were not long range and were designed for supporting of ground forces in a interdiction role. Fundamental Soviet doctrine clung to the idea of massive ground campaigns across the vast expanse of Russia as essential to the defense of the Motherland. Therefore, no strategic air force doctrine was published.
Those interwar years produced some valuable practical validation of the Soviet Air
Force in a ground support role. The Soviet-Japanese conflict of 1938-39 saw not only the successful us e of the combined arms team comprised of infantry-tanks-artillery, but also with aviation operating in concert. Interdiction-type strikes into the enemy rear were tested in Manchuria and essential to the victorious battle in Mongolia (under Zhukov).
By the late 1930s, just prior to and even following Stalin's purge of 1938, we see a Soviet Air Force that was welded inseparably to its subordinate role in support of the Red Army, and yet one which still had something of an "independent" streak deep within.
The Soviet Air Force, as is the case with the Red Army proper, must be viewed through the prism of Communist Party involvement and intervention. This not only impacts in terms of the commissars (political officers) attached to each unit (tantamount to a second chain of command), but also as regards to the daily involvement of the Politburo in how the Red Air Force was designed, organized, equipped and was to be missioned. This effect was one that contributed to the struggle over whether the air force should have an independent strategic role or be relegated to merely support of ground operations.
A look at some comparative numbers shows how the Organizational and aircraft type changes on the eve of hostilities with Germany indicate that the Soviet Air Force three important things: one, that they had learned some lessons from the Japanese-Soviet conflict in the Far East and the fighting in the Spanish Civil war; two, that a ground support role was in fact their primary function; and three that they still had a long way to go to solidify themselves doctrinally and organizationally.
The I-15, I-16 and even the I-153 fighters were inferior to the German
Messerschmitt, yet replacements were not yet available. The twin-engine SB-2 and SB-3 bombers were inferior to both the Ju88 and the He111. While they were being replaced, it was with lighter, faster machines whose primary purpose was ground support.
Organization changes reflected solidification of this "close air support" role as well.
Squadrons of 20-30 planes were being replaced (as the basic tactical unit) with regiments of 60-64 aircraft. In turn three to five such regiments would comprise an air division attached directly to a ground army for mission tasking. In assessing what these costs gained we must do so in view of the charter strategic bombing was given at the Casablanca Conference of 1942. The Anglo-American strategic bombing campaigns achieved about 75% of its mandate emanating from that conference. It can be said that they did cause the "progressive, destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems." However,
Germany was able to relocate and adapt much of its industry in reaction to such losses.
Moreover, the portion of the role not fulfilled was the undermining of the will of the German people. Other prewar theories and doctrines were validated however. The transportation plan in the weeks prior to Overlord gave credence to bombers in a deep interdiction role as well as strategic one. The oil campaign of June through August 1944 brought German aviation fuel production to a standstill by September and thus proved that precision bombardment was viable. While strategic bombing did not bring Germany to her knees by itself (as advocates had maintained) it did provide an incomparable measure of indispensability to the war effort. German estimates contend that by late 1944 over two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defense. Also, that about "30% of total gun production, 20% of heavy ammunition output, and 50% of electrotechnical production was devoted to the overall antiaircraft effort." In summation, the jury may be still out. The post-war Strategic bombing Survey concluded that had 12,000 -15,000 more tons be dropped on German transportation entities beginning in Feb 44 (vice Sep 44) the German war economy would have collapsed perhaps by the end of that year.
While Anglo-American strategic bombing attacked Germany from the west, in the east the Soviet Air Force was, at first, reeling from and then punishing the German Wermacht at the operational and tactical level. We have said before that Russia's preference for a strategic defense was fundamental to their overall doctrine of security.
Inherent in that doctrine, however, was implied the counter offensive. At the root of such an approach were certain "permanent operating factors" (also labeled "permanent factors of war"). Developed over time and codified in 1942 they were based, foremost, on the vast geographic bounds of Russia's territory. Stalin in particular held them as sacrosanct and even after the war rigidly refused to deviate from them -even when new conditions arose (namely the capabilities of nuclear weapons). These "factors" included: stability and morale on the home front, quantity of the army's divisions, morale of troops at the front and rear, numerical and quantitative superiority in equipment and personnel.
As previously indicated, the air force Russia would employ against and after continuing to suffer horrific losses due to Luftwaffee air superiority during daylight hours, the Soviet Air Force adopted a tactic that would prove successful.
Emerging from concealed positions amidst relatively primitive airfields, Il-4 twin engine bombers of a newly formed "long range" bomber force would strike German rear areas.
Concurrently, IL-2s and the old PO-2 biplane would hit German airfields. This process was repeated as often as five times each night. As a consequence, Luftwaffe fighter superiority was offset, and after five-six weeks of repetition not only were German aircraft being attrited, but disruption of German maneuver force staging and sustainment At first glance Soviet immediate post-war strategic vision was apparently little changed from that of the pre-war period. In fact evidence exists to suggest that.
Increases in the means to conduct armored war were not only maintained but also increased, fighter aircraft and close air support aircraft (such as the Shturmovik) production over that of bomber production remained the priority. But to use one of Churchill's favorite phrases, that was "more apparent than real." Indeed, Stalin's adherence to those "permanent factors" (especially the notion that Russia's vast territory would always preclude a successful enemy invasion) while resulting in efforts to continue a readiness based on the last war, was also beginning to accept that new conditions had While intercontinental bombing would be the province of the SRF with ICBMs, the requirement for regional theater bombing necessitated the production of and Red Air Force ability to employ those bombers originally intended for intercontinental use in a regional bombing role. Subsequent models, such as the, Tu-22M/BACKFIRE, were designed with that "in-theater" role in mind. Two considerations came into play in that regard. First, although slow in relation to the speed of missiles, these bombers afforded the Soviets the capacity to hit Europe-based enemies with nuclear weapons with comparative celerity (as opposed to the ten plus hours to strike mainland America in the same way). Second, by the mid-60's Khrushchev doctrinal premise that future wars would always be started by nuclear strikes abroad had been rejected. Instead the Soviet military had come to see that a world or regional war might be initiated with conventional weaponry. Accordingly, and to prevent immediately resorting to the nuclear trump card a need existed to have the capability to strike NATO targets with conventional warheadsa capability their SRF missiles did not have. Additionally, some of that bomber force could be withheld to carry nuclear bombs if developments warranted such use.
It is interesting to note that while the Soviet military had come to accept, with its own variances, the concept of strategic bombing, by the 1970's and 80's they had again shifted towards the more traditional view of a combined arms ground campaign being decisive in future wars. However, they did so not by returning that historical idea of a strategic defensive, but by envisioning a strategy by which they would strike offensively in Europe (conventionally and/or with nuclear weapons). In addition to a change in strategy, a shift in underlying war theory had taken place. In lieu of those "permanent factors", more evolving concepts were surfaced. In 1972 this was manifested in V.
Savkin's published "four laws" of war:
• course and outcome of war waged with unlimited employment of all conflict depend • primarily upon the correlation of available strictly military forces of the combatants at the beginning of the war, especially in nuclear weapons and means of delivery (italics mine).
• course and outcome of war depend on the correlation of the military potentials of the • combatants.
• Course and outcome of war depend on its political content.
• Course and outcome of war depend on the correlation of moral-political and • psychological capabilities of the people and armies of the combatants.
However, these were only "suggested" laws and not definitive. By 1977 the Soviet Military Encyclopedia had officially stated six laws of war:
• The dependence of war on its political goals. War is a social function whose essence • is determined by the political and social character of its people and their classes.
• The dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of economic • strengths of the warring states. Relative industrial capacity translates to relative military strength.
• The dependence of the course of war on the correlation of scientific potentials of the • warring sides. Technological-scientific development in a nation has significant impact on military power of that state.
• The dependence of the course and outcome of the war on the correlation of moral-• political strengths of the warring states. The ideologies and degree of psychological preparation of the armed forces and the populace have a major impact on relative military power.
• Dependence of the course and outcome of the war on the correlation of military • forces. Victory and defeat in war are defined by relative military power and mobilization potential of the warring sides.
• Historically, the side wins that offers and uses the resulting capabilities of a new and more progressive social and economic order.
These articulated beliefs were the result of two decades of repudiation of Stalin-era strategic doctrine. The air force and SRF strategic roles discussed in this chapter, and during that period of change, clearly give proof of that shift.
Analysis and Conclusions
Why did the Soviet Union not embrace the Douhetian theory of strategic bombing even as other world powers did? Throughout the 1920's and 30's leading nations around the world not only strove to create a viable air force for utilization in future wars, but did so with an emphasis on strategic bombing. This Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was viewed by its advocates as something that could potentially preclude massive, protracted land campaigns and the atrocious casualties inherent therein.
Extensive practical application of such a bombing theory in WWII, including the AngloAmerican effort against Germany and that nation's response, failed to alter the Soviet focus on certain "permanent factors" which precluded long range, strategic bombing of her adversaries. As Russia conducted a strategic defense against Germany on the Eastern Front, its Air Force found itself, initially destroyed in great numbers by a numerically inferior force -the Luftwaffe. This was due to several factors: technically poorer aircraft, outdated tactics, and (perhaps most significant of all), the fact that they were in the very midst of a structural and leadership reorganization and ill-prepared for the commencement of hostilities. Some token efforts at bombing Berlin aside, the fighting that raged on that front for four years between those two protagonists, confirmed to the Soviet senior leadership the correctness of using their air force in a ground support role.
That they were able to overcome those atrocious early setbacks and ultimately to gain air superiority over their German adversary was due to their ability to adopt to those shortcomings by changing tactics and organization, and by creating a bevy of new aircraft designed for that support role. Vastly superior numbers contributed greatly as well.
During this watershed period, the Soviet Air Force created the Long Range Aviation branch of the air force. Far from a strategic bombing arm, it was an operational level strike force. Its creation shows that they had expanded the ground support role of the air force beyond merely close air support to include deep battle interdiction as well. As stated in the second main point of this paper, only with the RMA of nuclear weapons (and the death of Stalin) was strategic bombing to become central to national security doctrine. The Cold War reinforced this shift, but also, ironically, resulted in (as the third main point of this work puts forth) the Soviet Air Force returning to its more traditional primary role of ground support. Manifesting this was the Soviet Union's creation of the Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) which assumed the major responsibility for transporting ICBMs towards America. Nonetheless, the strategic bombing force they had relied on was maintained as a theater -level force capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional bomb loads on NATO countries. This aircraft-based bombing force also afforded a strategic flexibility the SRF did not. Ironically, at this point in Soviet history strategic bombing meant striking at a Cold War enemy much farther away than ever contemplated in WWII. Meanwhile the aircraft bomber force was relegated to being prepared to strike at nations, within Europe itself, that would most certainly have been considered strategic in nature during the years when this theory was promulgated and practiced on its largest scale. In analyzing whether or not the Soviet military could, or should, have embraced strategic bombing theory sooner, we must ask if it was feasible, and if so, was it the best course of action available. Clearly, during the early development of the Soviet Air Force it was not really practical (despite the fact that such advocates existed, for a time). During WWII, however, such a force was possible. It might have even been effective. Yet, given the fact Russia was facing Germany totsally alone on the Eastern Front, their decision to create tactical ("frontal") and operational ("long range") aviation rather than strategic was a wise decision. The success that resulted in that theater bears testimony to that wisdom. Likewise with the advent of nuclear weapons. The Soviet leadership demonstrated admirable adaptability in creating a strategic bombing force to offset that of the U.S. Likewise, in the later stages of the Cold war, such flexibility was again manifested with the utilization of a mixed force of rockets and bombers that could (between the two) deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads intra-and intercontinentally.
